Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
A simple mechanism is presented that allocates an indivisible object between two agents for almost any possible compensation rule. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy guarantees a level of utility not less than -[epsilon], where [epsilon] can be arbitrarily small.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Mealem, Yosef |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 2, p. 165-167
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Indivisible object Individual rationality Guaranteed utility |
Saved in:
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