Impossibility of stable and nonbossy matching mechanisms
Stability is a central concept in matching theory, while nonbossiness is important in many allocation problems. We show that these properties are incompatible: there does not exist a matching mechanism that is both stable and nonbossy.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Kojima, Fuhito |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 107.2010, 1, p. 69-70
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Matching Stability Nonbossiness Impossibility theorem |
Saved in:
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