INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY IN LARGE GAMES
We argue that large games are of analytical interest partly because they can be understood in terms of a unifying condition of incentive-compatibility, strategyproofness. In contrast to finite games, strategy-proofness applies not only to dominantstrategy equilibria, but also to a large class of Nash equilibria and to Bayesian Nash equilibria with independent types. Based on Kolmogorov''s zero-one law, it is also shown that Bayesian Nash equilibria coincide with a class of Nash equilibria in games of incomplete information when there is a countably infinite number of players and types are independent.
Year of publication: |
2004-07-13
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Authors: | Nehring, Klaus |
Institutions: | Economics Department, University of California-Davis |
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