Traditionally, competition law has viewed issues of abuse of economic dependency or relative power as peripheral, focusing primarily on abuses rooted in dominance or substantial market power. However, this perspective is now being increasingly challenged by enforcers and policymakers. They are calling for a more comprehensive and effective approach to addressing abusive practices by firms that, although not entrenched in dominance in the traditional sense, still exert consequential influence. Several jurisdictions, particularly in Europe and East Asia, are responding to this call by integrating the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence or superior bargaining position into their competition law frameworks and actively enforcing it. Despite these developments, however, the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence, especially in the absence of dominance, remains an under-researched area within mainstream competition law discussions.This research endeavors to fill this gap by examining the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence as a competition law tool. The goal of this study is to advocate for the integration of the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence as a complementary mechanism to the existing abuse of dominance framework in competition law.Specifically, this study adopts a combination of theoretical exploration and empirical research. Theoretical discussions critically scrutinize the traditional dominance-centered and exclusion-focused approach to abuse, highlighting its inherent conceptual limitations and proposing a re-conceptualization of power, abuse, and harm. On the empirical side, the research surveys the legislative landscape in major jurisdictions and provides a practical analysis of potential strategies for implementing the prohibition of abuse of economic dependence in competition law. This analysis is based on the author’s preliminary research conducted across 34 jurisdictions in 2021.This study concludes by advocating for a more holistic and comprehensive understanding of market power and abuse, and for a more active role of competition law in cases of power asymmetry. Ultimately, this study posits that the inclusion of a separate provision prohibiting the abuse of economic dependence within competition law, as seen in France and Germany, is the most desirable approach. In instances where the prohibition of abuse of dependency is enforced outside but through the competition law framework, as in the cases of Japan or Korea, this study argues that certain limiting principles, such as relevance to competition or public interests, must be implemented to ensure harmony with other competition law tools
