Individual Rationality Under Sequential Decentralized Participation Processes
We consider the implementation of an economic outcome undercomplete information when the principal cannot commit to a simultaneousparticipation game. From a general class of sequential decentralizedparticipation processes and without common knowledge onthe details of the process, we introduce the concept of implementationunder robust sequential individual rationality. We solve the optimaldesign program: the principal may fail to extract fully agents' surplusrelative to the harsher threats but economic eciency is not damaged.
Year of publication: |
2007
|
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Authors: | Lamy, Laurent |
Institutions: | Centre de Recherche en Économie et Statistique (CREST), Groupe des Écoles Nationales d'Économie et Statistique (GENES) |
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