Individually rational equal loss principle for bargaining problems
The purpose of this paper is to provide a new solution concept for bargaining problems, which modifies Chun's Equal-Loss Solution in a way that ensures the individual rationality. We also consider its lexicographic extension which turns out to be both individually rational and Pareto Optimal. Characterizations of the proposed solutions are al so provided.
Year of publication: |
1992-11
|
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Authors: | Blanco, Carmen Herrero ; Gil, María del Carmen Marco |
Institutions: | Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE) |
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