Inequality, Coalitions and Collective Action

In a model where cooperation is beneficial, but subject to cheating, and is supported by trigger strategy punishments in a repeated game, we explore the relationship between the nature of cooperation (size and composition of coalitions) and underlying inequality in the distribution of private productive assets

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Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Bardhan, Pranab ; Singh, Nirvikar
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Koalition \| Coalition \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Wiederholte Spiele \| Repeated games \| Kooperatives Spiel \| Cooperative game

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (32 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 2004 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.550562 [DOI]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D30 - Distribution. General ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; O10 - Economic Development. General ; P0 - Economic Systems. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014071537