Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships.
In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, the authors distinguish among the effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is reported. All three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring. With imperfect monitoring, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities for cooperation, but the other two changes always have the reverse effect when the interest rate is small. Copyright 1991 by The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
1991
|
---|---|
Authors: | Abreu, Dilip ; Milgrom, Paul ; Pearce, David |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 59.1991, 6, p. 1713-33
|
Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Information and timing in repeated partnerships
Abreu, Dilip, (1988)
-
Information and timing in repeated partnerships
Abreu, Dilip, (1991)
-
Information and timing in repeated partnerships
Abreu, Dilip, (1990)
- More ...