Information, Incentives and Organizations; some Intertemporal Aspects.

The paper presents some recent research that examines, in the principal-agent framework, interaction effects of organizational design and incentives in the presence of asymmetric information and limited commitments.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	Olsen, T.E. ; Torsvik, G.
Institutions:	Institutt for Økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen
Subject:	INFORMATION \| INCENTIVES \| BUSINESS ORGANIZATION

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Series:	Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	22 pages
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D84 - Expectations; Speculations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783560