Informational Leverage and the Endogenous Timing of Product Introductions.

This paper provides a new rationale for bundling based on informational leverage. It is demonstrated that physically tying a product of established quality to one of unknown quality may mitigate the problem of asymetric information encountered in the latter market. Leveraging reputation in one market to provide information about product quality in a second market can have profound implications for the timing of new product introductions.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Choi, J.P.
Institutions:	Department of Economics, School of Arts and Sciences
Subject:	INFORMATION \| PRODUCTS \| ENTERPRISES

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	29 pages
Classification:	D80 - Information and Uncertainty. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L10 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance. General ; L15 - Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005162754