Insider information and performance pay
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Gayle, George-Levi ; Miller, Robert Allen |
Published in: |
CESifo economic studies : CESifo, a joint initiative of the University of Munich's Center for Economic Studies and the Ifo Institute. - Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, ISSN 1610-241X, ZDB-ID 2098761-4. - Vol. 55.2009, 3/4, p. 515-541
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Subject: | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Insiderhandel | Insider trading | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard |
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