Insider Trading, Investment, and Liquidity: A Welfare Analysis
We compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider, assuming inflexible ex ante aggregate investment choices by agents. Noise trading arises from aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare levels of outsiders can thus be ascertained. The allocations without insider trading are not ex ante Pareto efficient, because our model differs from standard ones with negative exponential utility functions and normal returns. We characterize the circumstances under which the revelation of payoff-relevant information via prices-arising from insider trading-benefits outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, by improving risk-sharing among them. Copyright The American Finance Association 2001.
Year of publication: |
2001
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Authors: | Bhattacharya, Sudipto |
Published in: |
Journal of Finance. - American Finance Association - AFA, ISSN 1540-6261. - Vol. 56.2001, 3, p. 1141-1156
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Publisher: |
American Finance Association - AFA |
Saved in:
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