Inter-partner Credible Threat in International Joint Ventures: An Infinitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Model
We use an infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma model to examine the role of inter-partner credible threat in international joint ventures (IJVs). Inter-partner credible threat refers to the certainty of either partner's retaliation given the other partner's earlier cheating. We argue that inter-partner credible threat represents the first order determinant and partners' management control represents the second order determinant of partner payoffs. When inter-partner credible threat is present, both partners achieve balanced payoffs whereas when it is absent, partners' relative control will determine their relative payoffs. In-depth interview data from four IJVs in China provide preliminary support for our theoretical arguments.© 2002 JIBS. Journal of International Business Studies (2002) 33, 457–478
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Zhang, Yan ; Rajagopalan, Nandini |
Published in: |
Journal of International Business Studies. - Palgrave Macmillan, ISSN 0047-2506. - Vol. 33.2002, 3, p. 457-478
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Publisher: |
Palgrave Macmillan |
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