Job search with bidder memories
This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos ; Menzio, Guido ; Smith, Eric |
Institutions: | Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta |
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