Justifiable preferences
We characterize preferences over acts that can be represented by a utility function and a multiple-prior, such that an act f is preferred to act g if there is a prior under which the expected utility induced by f is higher than that induced by g. These preferences are referred to as justifiable preferences. We further introduce a generalized model of ambiguity that involves a collection of multiple-priors, namely, multiple multiple-priors and incorporate Bewley[modifier letter apostrophe]s Knightian model in justifiability: f is preferred to g if, according to at least one set of priors, f is unanimously preferred to g.
| Year of publication: |
2011
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Lehrer, Ehud ; Teper, Roee |
| Published in: |
Journal of Economic Theory. - Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531. - Vol. 146.2011, 2, p. 762-774
|
| Publisher: |
Elsevier |
| Subject: | Justifiable preferences Multiple-prior Multiple multiple-prior |
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