Large Breach Penalties and Managers´ Incentives to Invest Inside or Outside Firms
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Meccheri, Nicola |
Published in: |
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE). - ISSN 0932-4569. - Vol. 165.2009, 4, p. 598-621
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Extent: | text/html |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Classification: | G30 - Corporate Finance and Governance. General ; J24 - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity ; J38 - Public Policy ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets |
Source: |
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Armstrong, Chris, (2013)
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The insider-outsider theory: a survey
Lindbeck, Assar, (2002)
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The insider-outsider theory : a survey
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