Learning and tacit collusion by artificial agents in Cournot duopoly games
Year of publication: |
2005
|
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Authors: | Kimbrough, Steven O. ; Lu, Ming ; Murphy, Frederic |
Published in: |
Formal modelling in electronic commerce. - Berlin : Springer, ISBN 3-540-21431-3. - 2005, p. 477-492
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Subject: | Duopol | Duopoly | Lernprozess | Learning process | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kartell | Cartel | Agentenbasierte Modellierung | Agent-based modeling | Wettbewerbsbeschränkung | Restraints of competition | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games |
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