Learning by trial and error
A person learns by trial and error if he occasionally tries out new strategies, rejecting choices that are erroneous in the sense that they do not lead to higher payoffs. In a game, however, strategies can become erroneous due to a change of behavior by someone else. We introduce a learning rule in which behavior is conditional on whether a player experiences an error of the first or second type. This rule, called interactive trial and error learning, implements Nash equilibrium behavior in any game with generic payoffs and at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
Year of publication: |
2009
|
---|---|
Authors: | Young, H. Peyton |
Published in: |
Games and Economic Behavior. - Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256. - Vol. 65.2009, 2, p. 626-643
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Keywords: | Learning Adaptive dynamics Nash equilibrium Bounded rationality |
Saved in:
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
The diffusion of innovations in social networks
Young, H. Peyton, (2000)
-
Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation
Young, H. Peyton, (1998)
-
Social coordination and social change
Young, H. Peyton, (1996)
- More ...