Learning in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Collateral and Incomplete Information
Year of publication: |
2011-11
|
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Authors: | Brangewitz, Sonja ; Giraud, Gael |
Institutions: | Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld |
Subject: | Strategic Market Games | Infinite Horizon | Incomplete Markets | Collateral | Incomplete Information |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Number 456 49 pages |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D52 - Incomplete Markets ; G12 - Asset Pricing ; G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies ; G18 - Government Policy and Regulation |
Source: |
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Learning in infinite horizon strategic market games with collateral and incomplete information
Brangewitz, Sonja, (2011)
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Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default.
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Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default.
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