Learning in Potential Games.
We consider repeated play of so-called potential games. Numerous modes of play are shown to yield Nash equilibrium in the long run. We point to procedures that can account for society-wide constraints concerning efficiency.
Year of publication: |
1997-06
|
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Authors: | Ermoliev, Y.M. ; Flam, S.D. |
Institutions: | International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) |
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