Licensees as Entry Barriers.
In a more general setting than has been considered hitherto, this paper examines how the incumbent in a market threatened by entry can exploit its first-mover advantage by licensing its technology not to a potential entrant but to firms that would have remained outside the industry. It is shown, among other things, that the incumbent may subsidize the variable costs of its licensees in order to deter entry. Even when entry is not deterred, it is demonstrated that the incumbent might opt to invite outsiders as licensees.
Year of publication: |
1994
|
---|---|
Authors: | Eswaran, Mukesh |
Published in: |
Canadian Journal of Economics. - Canadian Economics Association - CEA. - Vol. 27.1994, 3, p. 673-88
|
Publisher: |
Canadian Economics Association - CEA |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Technology-trading coalitions in supergames
Eaton, Curtis, (1994)
-
Export led development : primary vs. industrial
Eswaran, Mukesh, (1991)
-
The theory of real wage growth in LDCs
Eswaran, Mukesh, (1991)
- More ...