Limits of acyclic voting
Year of publication: |
May 2016
|
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Authors: | Duggan, John |
Published in: |
Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 163.2016, p. 658-683
|
Subject: | Acyclicity | Voting | Preference aggregation | Arrow's theorem | Positive responsiveness | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Unmöglichkeitstheorem | Impossibility theorem | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Aggregation |
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