Lobbying of Firms by Voters

A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible.

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Year of publication:	2009-07-31
Authors:	Dahm, Matthias ; Dur, Robert ; Glazer, Amihai
Institutions:	Tinbergen Institute
Subject:	Lobbying \| voting \| special interests \| influence

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers Number 09-068/1
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964459