Location choice and optimal zoning under Cournot competition
This paper introduces a symmetric zoning regulation into a spatial Cournot competition model and analyzes how this intervention affects equilibrium locations and social welfare. It is shown that firms will locate separately at the two endpoints of a wide enough zoning enacted in the middle area of a linear market. This location pattern implies that social welfare can be improved by implementing a proper zoning regulation.
Year of publication: |
2008
|
---|---|
Authors: | Chen, Chin-Sheng ; Lai, Fu-Chuan |
Published in: |
Regional Science and Urban Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0166-0462. - Vol. 38.2008, 2, p. 119-126
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Location choice and optimal zoning under Cournot competition
Chen, Chin-sheng, (2008)
-
Location choice and optimal zoning under Cournot competition
Chen, Chin-Sheng, (2008)
-
Location choice and optimal zoning under Cournot competition
Chen, Chin-Sheng, (2008)
- More ...