Lower Sanctions, Greater Antitrust Compliance? Cartel Conduct with Imperfect Information about Enforcement Risk
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Paha, Johannes |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaft Abteilung, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | Forthcoming in 37 pages |
Classification: | K21 - Antitrust Law ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; L41 - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices |
Source: |
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