Managerial overconfidence and bank bailouts
Year of publication: |
2020
|
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Authors: | Gietl, Daniel ; Kassner, Bernhard |
Published in: |
Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681, ZDB-ID 864321-0. - Vol. 179.2020, p. 202-222
|
Subject: | Bailouts | Banking regulation | Bonus taxes | Overconfidence | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Schuldenübernahme | Bailout | Bankenaufsicht | Banking supervision | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis | Vertrauen | Confidence | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory |
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