Many inspections are manipulable
Year of publication: |
2008
|
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Authors: | Shmaya, Eran |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - New York, NY : The Econometric Society, ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 3.2008, 3, p. 367-382
|
Publisher: |
New York, NY : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Forecasting | calibration | zero-sum games |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 895401754 [GVK] hdl:10419/150116 [Handle] RePEc:the:publsh:398 [RePEc] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: |
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Many inspections are manipulable
Shmaya, Eran, (2008)
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Many inspections are manipulable
Shmaya, Eran, (2008)
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