Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences
We consider the many-to-many two-sided matching problem under a stringent domain restriction on preferences called the max-min criterion. We show that, even under this restriction, there is no stable mechanism that is weakly Pareto efficient, strategy-proof, or monotonic (i.e. respects improvements) for agents on one side of the market. These results imply in particular that three of the main results of [4] are incorrect.
Year of publication: |
2012-12
|
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Authors: | Hatfield, John ; Kojima, Fuhito ; Narita, Yusuke |
Institutions: | Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (SIEPR), Stanford University |
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