Markets for influence
We specify an oligopoly game, where firms choose quantity in order to maximize profits, that is strategically equivalent to a standard Tullock rent-seeking game. We then show that the Tullock game may be interpreted as an oligopsonistic market for influence. Alternative specifications of the strategic variable give rise to a range of Nash equilibria with varying levels of rent dissipation.
Year of publication: |
2010
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Authors: | Menezes, Flavio M. ; Quiggin, John |
Published in: |
International Journal of Industrial Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187. - Vol. 28.2010, 3, p. 307-310
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Contests Oligopoly Strategy space |
Saved in:
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