Matching with Contracts
We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new "law of aggregate demand" for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions.
Year of publication: |
2005
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Authors: | Hatfield, John William ; Milgrom, Paul R. |
Published in: |
American Economic Review. - American Economic Association - AEA. - Vol. 95.2005, 4, p. 913-935
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Publisher: |
American Economic Association - AEA |
Saved in:
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