Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good
We consider the problem of choosing a level of a public good on an interval of the real line among a group of agents. A probabilistic rule chooses a probability distribution over the interval for each preference profile. We investigate strategy-proof probabilistic rules in the case where distributions are compared based on stochastic dominance relations. First, on a “minimally rich domain”, we characterize the so-called probabilistic generalized median rules (Ehlers et al., J Econ Theory 105:408–434, <CitationRef CitationID="CR11">2002</CitationRef>) by means of stochastic-dominance (sd) strategy-proofness and ontoness. Next, we study how much we can enlarge a domain to allow for the existence of sd-strategy-proof probabilistic rules that satisfy ontoness and the no-vetoer condition. We establish that the domain of “convex” preferences is the unique maximal domain including a minimally rich domain for these properties. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Morimoto, Shuhei |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 41.2013, 3, p. 637-669
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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