Minimum Quality Standards and Collusion.
The authors model the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly. They extend the literature by determining the standard endogenously, showing that the maximization of social welfare entails an increase in the surplus accruing to consumers served by the low quality firm and a decrease in the surplus of the remaining consumers. Then, the authors consider the effects of the standard on the stability of price collusion, proving that the standard makes it more difficult for firms to collude if consumers are sufficiently rich. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Year of publication: |
1997
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Authors: | Ecchia, Giulio ; Lambertini, Luca |
Published in: |
Journal of Industrial Economics. - Wiley Blackwell. - Vol. 45.1997, 1, p. 101-13
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Publisher: |
Wiley Blackwell |
Saved in:
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