Moins de fonctionnaires mais mieux payés ? Un test de l'approche partisane de l'emploi public
This article examines the trade-off between the number of public employees and the average salary offered to them, for a given exogenous wage bill. This existence of a partisan platform ? a political party that offers few jobs but better paid and another political party which increases the number of jobs for a relatively low salary ? is tested on 23 countries during the period 1960-2009. Ceteris Paribus, we show that the left (resp. the right) parties significantly increase the number of jobs (resp. the average wage) for a given amount of public expenditure.
Year of publication: |
2012
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Authors: | Bacache-Beauvallet, Maya |
Published in: |
Revue d'économie politique. - Dalloz. - Vol. 122.2012, 6, p. 1011-1027
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Publisher: |
Dalloz |
Saved in:
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