MONOTONICITY IMPLIES STRATEGY-PROOFNESS FOR CORRESPONDENCES
We show that Maskin monotone social choice correspondences on sufficiently rich domains satisfy a generalized strategy-proofness property, thus generalizing Muller and Satterthwaite''s (1977) theorem to correspondences. From the point of view of Nash implementation theory, the result yields a partial characterization of the restrictions entailed by Nash implementability. Alternatively, the result can be viewed as a possibility theorem on the dominant-strategy-implementability of monotone SCCs via set-valued mechanisms for agents who are completely ignorant about the finally selected outcome. It is shown by examples that stronger strategy-proofness properties fail easily.
Year of publication: |
2003-01-09
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Authors: | Nehring, Klaus ; Marcellino, Massimiliano |
Institutions: | Economics Department, University of California-Davis |
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