Moral Hazard, Aggregate Risk and Nominal Linear Financial Contracts
Year of publication: |
1999-09-14
|
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Authors: | Alessandro, CITANNA ; Archishman, CHAKRABORTY |
Institutions: | HEC Paris (École des Hautes Études Commerciales) |
Subject: | moral hazard | linear contracts |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | The text is part of a series Les Cahiers de Recherche - Groupe HEC Number 683 31 pages |
Classification: | D50 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information |
Source: |
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