Moral Hazard in Teams with Uncertainty, and Transfers or Repetition as Enforcement Mechanisms
Year of publication: |
1994-12-01
|
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Authors: | d ASPREMONT, Claude ; GERARD-VARET, Louis-André |
Institutions: | Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain |
Subject: | Mechanism design | team moral hazard | folk theorem |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Notes: | The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Number 1994073 |
Classification: | D2 - Production and Organizations ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making |
Source: |
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