Multiattribute auctions support automated negotiation insettings where buyers and sellers have valuations for alternateconfigurations of a good, as defined by configurationattributes. Bidders express offers to buy or sell alternateconfigurations by specifying configuration-dependent reserve prices,and the auction determines both the traded goods and transactionprices based on these offers.While multiattribute auctions have been deployed in single-buyerprocurement settings, the development of double-sided multiattributeauctions-allowing the free participation of both buyers andsellers-has received little attention from academia or industry.In this work I develop a multiattribute call market, aspecific type of double auction in which bids accumulate over anextended period of time, before the auction determines trades basedon the aggregate collection of bids. Building on a polynomial-timeclearing algorithm, I contribute an efficient algorithm forinformation feedback. Supporting the implementation of market-basedalgorithms, information feedback support extends the range ofsettings for which multiattribute call markets achieve efficiency.Multiattribute auctions are only one of many auction variantsintroduced in recent years. The rapidly growing space ofalternative auctions and trading scenarios calls for both astandardized language with which to specify auctions, as well as acomputational test environment in which to evaluate alternatedesigns. I present a novel auction description language anddeployment environment that supports the specification of a broadclass of auctions, improving on prior approaches through a scriptinglanguage that employs both static parameter settings and rule-basedbehavior invocation. The market game platform, AB3D, canexecute these auction scripts to implement multi-auction andmulti-agent trading scenarios.The efficiency of multiattribute call markets depends crucially onthe underlying valuations of participants. I analyze the expectedperformance limitations of multiattribute call markets, usingexisting analytical results where applicable. Addressing a lack oftheoretical guidance in many natural settings, I introduce acomputational metric on bidder valuations, and show a correlationbetween this metric and the expected efficiency of multiattributecall markets. As further validation, I integrate multiattributemarkets into an existing supply chain simulation, demonstratingefficiency gains over a more conventional negotiation procedure.