MULTIDIMENSIONAL SIGNALING IN THE LABOR MARKET
I consider a two-dimensional job market signaling model in which firms care about a worker's personal network as well as his technical productivity, and a worker can choose both academic activity and social activity to signal his ability. In a simple model where the social activity forming a social network does not require special ability, I show that the Cho-Kreps intuitive criterion singles out Spence's outcome of signaling high academic ability by high education. I also demonstrate the possibility that a worker with high academic ability may underinvest in education when the social ability is correlated with the academic ability. Copyright © 2007 The Author; Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd and The University of Manchester.
Year of publication: |
2007
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Authors: | KIM, JEONG-YOO |
Published in: |
Manchester School. - School of Economics, ISSN 1463-6786. - Vol. 75.2007, s1, p. 64-87
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Publisher: |
School of Economics |
Saved in:
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