Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
In this paper we study the problem of the Nash implementation in private good economies when preferences are single-dipped by allowing multiple best indifferent elements. We give a full characterization in this domain by showing that a social choice correspondence (SCC) is Nash implementable if and only if satisfies Maskin monotonicity. To support this result, we give examples of some well-known SCCs that satisfying or not satisfying Maskin's proprieties.
Year of publication: |
2013
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---|---|
Authors: | Ahmed, Doghmi |
Published in: |
Mathematical Economics Letters. - De Gruyter. - Vol. 1.2013, 1, p. 35-42
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Publisher: |
De Gruyter |
Subject: | Nash implementation | private good economies | single-dipped domain with indifferences |
Saved in:
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