New constructions of obviously strategyproof mechanisms
Year of publication: |
2023
|
---|---|
Authors: | Ferraioli, Diodato ; Meier, Adrian ; Penna, Paolo ; Ventre, Carmine |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5471, ZDB-ID 2004273-5. - Vol. 48.2023, 1, p. 332-362
|
Subject: | deferred acceptance algorithms | extensive form mechanisms | machine scheduling | obviously strategyproof mechanisms | set systems |
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