Observability and incentive in organizations

The paper shows that producer-owned firms are more efficient in quality provision than investor-owned firms if input quality is observable, while they are less efficient when the input quality is unobservable and the size of the organization is large.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Li, Sanxi ; Ye, Bing ; Yu, Jianyu
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 114.2012, 2, p. 205-207
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Producer-owned firm \| Investor-owned firm \| Moral hazard in team \| Observability

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D2 - Production and Organizations ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior ; L3 - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572201