On the Approximation of Value Correspondences
Recursive game theory provides theoretical procedures for computing the equilibrium payoff sets of repeated games and the equilibrium payoff correspondences of dynamic games. In this paper, we propose and implement outer and inner approximation methods for value correspondences that naturally occur in the analysis of dynamic games.The procedure utilizes set-valued step functions. We provide an application to a bilateral insurance game with storage.
Authors: | Sleet, Christopher ; Yeltekin, Sevin |
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Institutions: | Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business |
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