On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
Year of publication: |
1999
|
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Authors: | Yi, Sang-seung |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 26.1999, 2, p. 353-364
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Subject: | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Koalition | Coalition | Pareto-Optimum | Pareto efficiency | Theorie | Theory |
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