On the economics of whistle-blowing behavior: the role of incentives
Year of publication: |
2010-03-24
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Authors: | Villena, Mauricio G. ; Villena, Marcelo J. |
Institutions: | Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München |
Subject: | Corruption | whistle-blowing | social norms | evolutionary games |
Extent: | application/pdf |
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Series: | |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Classification: | D73 - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption ; K42 - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games |
Source: |
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