On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium
We show that even in very simple oligopolies with differential information a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. However, we find sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are allowed.
Year of publication: |
2007-03
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Authors: | Einy, Ezra ; Haimanko, Ori ; Moreno, Diego ; Shitovitz, Benyamin |
Institutions: | Departamento de EconomÃa, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
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