On the Existence of Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria in Large Games
We consider an asymptotic version of Mas-Colells theorem on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in large games. Our result states that, if players payoff functions are selected from an equicontinuous family, then all sufficiently large games have an " pure, " equilibrium for all " > 0. We also show that our result is equivalent to Mas-Colells existence theorem, implying that it can properly be considered as its asymptotic version.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Carmona, Guilherme |
Institutions: | Faculdade de Economia, Universidade Nova de Lisboa |
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