On the Relocation Game of Ride-Hailing Platforms with Non-Atomic Drivers
Vacant drivers spontaneously relocate to mitigate the supply-demand imbalance embedded in ride-hailing services. In this study, we aim at addressing two fundamental questions. (i) To what extent can drivers' spontaneous relocation resolve the supply-demand imbalance? (ii) How does a ride-hailing platform design subsidy strategies to induce drivers' spontaneous relocation behaviors to cope with the platform-optimum goals? Specifically, we propose a leader-follower game theoretical framework to investigate the dynamic relocation game on a finite service network. The platform as the leader designs relocation subsidies to achieve service-oriented/interest-oriented goals, whereas idle drivers as followers then relocate to maximize individual utility, leading to a multistage driver equilibrium. We prove the existence of the equilibrium and utilize Mann Iteration with the shrunk relocation-destination-choice set to solve it efficiently. We derive the analytical conditions concerning the supply-demand profile and the platform commission rate, where the platform does not need to subsidize drivers but can simply rely on their spontaneous relocation to achieve the platform goals. For other cases where spontaneous relocation cannot achieve system optimum, we analytically prove that the gaps are bounded by constant discounts. Further, we depict the non-empty subsidy strategy for the platform to induce the relocation flow achieving system optimum. Thereafter, we extend the model to accommodate the sign-in/sign-off activities of drivers during the shift, their choice uncertainty, heterogeneous service forms, and elastic trip demands. A realistic data set is utilized to calibrate the models and derive managerial insights empirically
Year of publication: |
[2023]
|
---|---|
Authors: | Wang, Yi-Neng ; Lin, Xi ; He, Fang ; Xu, Zhengtian ; Shen, Zuo-Jun Max |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (64 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 20, 2023 erstellt |
Other identifiers: | 10.2139/ssrn.4454177 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014360577
Saved in favorites
Similar items by person
-
Rhythmic control of automated traffic, part II, grid network rhythm and online routing
Lin, Xi, (2021)
-
Dynamic Pricing and Service Fulfillment of Mobile Charging Systems with Stochastic Demands
Yang, Jie, (2022)
-
Mechanism Design for Stochastic Dynamic Parking Resource Allocation
Yang, Jie, (2021)
- More ...