On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict
We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines compete for the economy’s resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: in ethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners at low cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number of implications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as the incidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, and expropriable resources.
Year of publication: |
2008-06
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Authors: | Caselli, Francesco ; II, Wilbur John Coleman |
Institutions: | Centre for Economic Development and Institutions (CEDI), Brunel University |
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