On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting.
This paper presents a systematic framework for studying infinitely-repeated games with discounting, focusing on pure strategy (subgame) perfect equilibria. It introduces a number of concepts whi ch organize the theory in a natural way. These include the idea of an optimal penal code, and the related notions of simple penal codes an d simple strategy profiles. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
Year of publication: |
1988
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Authors: | Abreu, Dilip |
Published in: |
Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 56.1988, 2, p. 383-96
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Publisher: |
Econometric Society |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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