Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
Year of publication: |
2022
|
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Authors: | Sung, Jaeyoung |
Published in: |
Economic theory. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1432-0479, ZDB-ID 1398355-6. - Vol. 74.2022, 2, p. 593-642
|
Subject: | Managerial compensation | Mean-volatility ambiguity | Moral hazard | Optimal contract | Perception asymmetry | Stock option | Volatility control | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Moral Hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Aktienoption | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Führungskräfte | Managers | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Volatilität | Volatility | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Risiko | Risk |
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