Optimal contracting under mean-volatility joint ambiguity uncertainties
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Sung, Jaeyoung |
Subject: | Managerial compensation | Mean-volatility ambiguity | Moral hazard | Optimal contract | Perception asymmetry | Stock option | Volatility control | Aktienoption | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Volatilität | Volatility | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Risiko | Risk | Führungskräfte | Managers | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vertrag | Contract | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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